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11. Introduction
A well-established stylised fact is that massive flows of factors of production is a continuous
process and well above what is necessary to accommodate the net changes for an economy.1 It
is also established that to a large extent these changes - for instance measured as newly created
and destructed jobs - are permanent changes. Hence, modernisation or restructuring is taking
place via a continuous process of entry and exit of plants and growth and reduction of
incumbents. Theories emphasising producer heterogeneity via learning processes and market
selection are developed and tested empirically to explain these observations. One hypothesis in
particular has gained strong empirical support; young plants have higher exit rates than old
plants.2 This result is in accordance with theories of active and passive learning processes such
as models by Jovanovic (1982) and Pakes and Ericson (1992), predicting that young
establishments should have a lower survival rate, where plant age is a proxy for the
productivity.
In spite of the large literature on producer heterogeneity and firm exit behaviour little
attention has been paid to the capital vintage theory of firm exit behaviour as an alternative
hypothesis (see Johansen, 1959, 1972, Førsund and Hjalmarsson, 1991, Solow, 1956, 1960,
Greenwood and Jovanovich, 1998). Interpreted at the firm level this theory predicts that plants
with old vintages of capital – a proxy for low efficiency - have higher exit rates than plants with
more recent vintages of capital. However, it is not clear how strong the vintage effect is in
determining exit rates. Through investments old plants may acquire the most recent
technologies or new cohorts of plants may invest in old vintages of capital. For instance, for the
US manufacturing little empirical support for a high correlation between capital age and plant
age has been found, cf. Dunne (1994).
The main aim of the present paper is to disentangle the distinct effects of selection and
                                               
1 See for instance Geroski (1991) and a special issue of International Journal of Industrial Organization (Vol.
13 No. 4, 1995) on plant turnover and growth pattern of firms. The other strand of literature is the recent
work on gross job flows. Important contributions are Leonard (1987), Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989),
Davis and Haltiwanger (1990; 1992), Blanchard and Diamond (1990), Boeri and Cramer (1992). See Klette
and Mathiassen (1996a) and Salvanes (1997) on the effects of job turnover in Norway, and Salvanes and
Førre (1998) for turnover by worker categories.
2  See Evans (1987), Dunne, Roberts and Samuleson (1989), Boeri and Bellmann (1995), Doms, Dunne and
Roberts (1995), Audretch and Mahmood (1995), Mata and Portugal (1997). See in particular Klette and
Mathiassen (1996b, chapter 6) for an analysis on the effect of plant age and productivity for the Norwegian
manufacturing sector for the period 1976-86.
2vintage capital on exit rates by using a machine capital age index in addition to the age of the
plant. A panel of Norwegian manufacturing establishment level data from 1976 to 1992 is used.
Our hypothesis is that both effects occur, predicting a U-shaped pattern of exit rates in the age
of the establishment. The failure rate is first expected to decrease in plant age due to selection
and/or learning effects, and then to increase due to the vintage capital effect. Further, little
attention has been paid so far in the empirical IO-literature on exit behaviour to the panel
structure of establishment observations. In the empirical literature the exit rates estimated as a
function of firm age are conditioned on other observable variables such type of industry, the
degree of industry competition etc., but unobserved variables may also be correlated with
included variables causing biased results. Since we have a panel data set we are able to
incorporate the unobserved relationship of firms over time by including random effects in the
exit model as well as testing the stability of the results by including observable variables in
addition to establishment age and capital age. In order to test how the strength of the vintage
effect might depend on market conditions, we test a prediction from Lambson’s (1991) model.
His model predicts a weak vintage effect in industries characterised by low sunk costs in that
entering firms will choose both standard and advanced technologies and thus a variability in
exit rates is expected while in industries with high sunk costs producers are expected to choose
the same technology.
Secondly, the paper contributes to the controversial point of whether restructuring is
clustered in downturns via a “shake-out” effect on plants or a “cleansing” effect. A central part
of models of "cleansing" in recessions is the capital vintage model where a Schumpeterian
creative destruction process occurs involving the exit of old plants with outdated technology
(see for instance Blanchard and Diamond, 1990; Caballero and Hammour, 1994, 1996). The
second element is that these theories predict a tendency to reduce during recessions due to for
instance changing opportunity costs of restructuring over the business. The empirical evidence
on counter-cyclical restructuring is mixed. In the job turnover literature a counter-cyclical
pattern for job destruction including both job reduction and exit of plants are found for some
countries but not for others.3 Few micro level studies exist on the relationship between survival
                                               
3 In particular, studies from North-America show that job turnover is counter-cyclical (Davis and Haltiwanger,
1990, 1992). For the UK and the Netherlands counter-cyclical job turnover have been found for large firms
(Konings, 1995, Broersma and Gautier, 1995). For Danish manufacturing in the period 1980-91 the pattern
is acyclical (Albæk and Sørensen, 1998). Boeri (1996) compares seven OECD countries – including Norway
- and finds limited support for counter-cyclical job turnover in Europe.
3and growth of plants and aggregate fluctuations. In a study by Boeri and Bellmann (1995)
using a panel of German manufacturing plants for the period 1979-1992, no relationship is
found between exit rates and cyclical fluctuations. We test whether the exit probability is
counter-cyclical using different proxies for the business cycle and distinguishing between a
minor and a major slump. Further, by incorporating interaction terms between the business
cycle indicator and the vintage of capital and the age of the establishment, we test whether
restructuring in downturns is related to the age of establishment or to the age of the capital.
The rest of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the model to be estimated.
Section 3 presents the data set and some background information of the Norwegian economy
in the data period. In Section 4 the results from the empirical examination of our hypotheses
are presented. Section 5 concludes.
2. Theories of plant exit and econometric specification
2.1  Three models of plant exit
The aim of this paper is first to extend the empirical literature on the post entry performance of
plants by using a panel of plant data to examine in fuller detail the plant level heterogeneity.
Three theories exist for plant exit. The selection model or passive learning model due to
Jovanovic (1982) predicts that firms learn about their relative abilities at the date of entry via a
selection process of firms. In the second model, active learning or evolutionary learning model,
the firms initial ability is not as important as their ability at making progress and reducing the
gap between themselves and the incumbents (Pakes and Ericson, 1992). Both these theories
predict that the age of the plant as a proxy for productivity reduces the exit rate. The vintage
capital model interpreted at the firm level predicts that the age of capital increases the exit rate
of firms (Johansen, 1959, 1972; Solow, 1956, 1960). The main point is that new technology is
embodied in the latest vintages of capital. Thus new capital is better or more productive than
old capital not only because of wear and tear but because new capital was more productive
than old capital even when the old capital was new. Most focus in the empirical literature has
so far been on testing the effect of plant age on exit probability by including the age of the
establishment. The empirical support is strong for higher exit rates for young establishments,
4cf. Evans (1987), Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989), Boeri and Bellmann (1995), Doms,
Dunne and Roberts (1995), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995). The alternative hypothesis of a
vintage effect – or in our view a complementary hypotheses in that both plant age and capital
vintage influence the probability of exit– has not been tested to any degree.4 When testing for
the vintage effect – for instance in cases of testing models of cleansing effects of downturns –
the age of the establishment has been used as a proxy for the vintage of capital due to data
limitations (Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) and Caballero and Hammour, 1994, 1996). This
presumption probably has poor empirical support, cf. Dunne (1994). Through investments old
plants often acquire the most recent technologies. Our hypothesis is that both effects exist
simultaneously in an industry. By incorporating both the plants’ age and the age of the plants’
capital constructed by using investments in machinery based on Mairesse’s (1978) approach,
we are able to disentangle the distinct effects of selection and vintage capital on exit rates. A
U-shaped pattern of exit rates in the age of plants is expected when both forces are active. The
failure rate of plants is first expected to decrease in plant age due to the selection or learning
effect, and then the exit rate is expected to increase due to the vintage capital effect.
2.2 The cleansing effect of recessions
The next question we examine is whether restructuring via exits is concentrated in downturns,
and whether this is via a stronger selection process or via a stronger capital vintage effect. In
the empirical IO-literature little attention has been devoted to the relationship between
aggregate economic fluctuations and new establishment survival and growth. This can probably
partly be explained by the lack of panel data that covers at least one business cycle. Notable
exceptions are Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) and Boeri and Bellmann (1995) who analyse
the influence of the business cycle on firm survival rates. The latter study also examines the
cyclical sensitivity of new firm growth. Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) find that the hazard
rate of new firms increases with the unemployment rate, which is used as a proxy for the
business cycle. In other words, new firms are more likely to fail during macroeconomic
downturns. Boeri and Bellmann (1995), who employ the growth rate of unemployment, find
                                               
4 See Johansen (1972) in chapter 9 and Eide (1969) found some support for a vintage effect on the productivity
of vessels using data for Norwegian tankers.
5that hazard rates of new firms are not responsive to the business cycle. Furthermore, they find
that the growth of surviving entrants exhibits little cyclical sensitivity.
Most of the recent focus on downturns as a cleansing period comes from the recent job
creation literature. In some of these studies job turnover is found to be counter-cyclical,
indicating restructuring in recessions, and the driving force is an asymmetry between job
creation and job destruction. Several theories have been proposed to explain the asymmetry
between job creation and destruction characterised by concentration of increased by job
reductions in recessions. The mechanisms in these models are either asymmetry in labour
adjustment costs, or between hiring and firing, the different time it takes to hire and fire, or by
a change in the opportunity costs of making changes over the cycle. For instance, if there exists
costs associated with establishing or creating a new job but no firing costs, job destruction will
be more dependent on a contemporaneous shock than job creation (Davis and Haltiwanger,
1990). Hence, both in upturns and downturns job creation will be slower to adjust and
smoothed out over the cycle. Somewhat different is the theory proposed by Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) using a matching model approach. Here job creation takes time in order to
establish a successful match. During an upturn when the labour market is tight, it is difficult to
fill newly created jobs. During a recession, jobs are destroyed immediately. A third class of
models focuses on the differences in opportunity costs in terms of foregone production
between a boom and a recession when changes in labour or capital are being made (Blanchard
and Diamond, 1990, Caballero and Hammour, 1994, 1996).
Although somewhat different in spirit, these models basically provide explanations for
why job turnover and thereby some kind of restructuring, takes place mainly in recessions
although high turnover is a continuous process. Some of the models - especially models
focusing on low opportunity costs foregone in a recession - have the common feature that a
recession is a time of shake-out for industries or that there is a "cleansing" effect of recessions.
Notable here is Caballero and Hammour (1994, 1996) who explicitly state this. The empirical
results concerning this "cleansing" effect are still scarce. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), have
some support for the shakeout hypothesis in that job reductions are mainly among large and old
plants.
2.3 Econometric specification
6Based on this discussion we postulate an exit function as follows:
EXITit = f(PLANTAGEit, CAPAGEit, BUSCYCLEt, Xit,),
where subscript i refers to plant and subscript t refers to the year, EXIT is a dummy variable
which takes the value one if the plant shuts down, PLANTAGE is the age of the plant,
CAPAGE is the age of the machine capital equipment. Both the age of the establishment and
the vintage of capital include second-order terms in order to capture non-linearity of the exit
rate in plant age and capital age. BUSCYCLE is and index for the business cycle, and X is a
vector of other determinants of plant exit which is not of primary interest in this study but
which nevertheless should be introduced into the model in order to avoid omitted-variables
biases in our estimates.
We use Mairesse's (1978) age index measure for the capital equipment:
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and, It = nominal investments (purchase less sales) in capital equipment, Kt = real stock of
capital equipment in period t, KtV = nominal stock of capital equipment of vintage V in period t,
pt is the price index in year t (the whole sale price index), at
V  is the mean age of capital
equipment acquired before t0, which is the first time period data is available for (i.e., 1977). For
plants established prior to 1977 we computed a proxy for at
V  based on aggregate machine
capital and investments data in the industry which the plant belonged to (at the 4- and 5-digit
SIC level).5
The age index definition implies that in year t = t0 the age index At = 1. If real
investments Ivpv are identical in all years, investments in period t-1 will increase the age index
At more than investments in the subsequent period t due to the factor (t - tv) in the age index
equation. We only use the age index for machine capital in our model, as the performance of
plants should be less affected by the age of building capital.
                                               
5 Statistics Norway supplied industry aggregate investments and capital data.
7We employ several different business cycle indicators. The first, GDPGROW, is the
percentage change in Norwegian GDP from the previous year, which can be regarded as the
standard indicator of the business cycle. Another business cycle indicator we use is the
percentage deviation from the GDP trend growth. Using annual real GDP for the period 1973-
92 we employed the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to estimate the GDP trend. The motivation
for using deviations from the trend is that when decision-makers in firms look at the macro
economic environment, they may be more concerned about deviations in GDP growth from the
trend than the absolute level of GDP growth. The trend GDP growth is regarded by decision-
makers as the ‘normal’ state. GDP growth below the trend is regarded as deterioration of the
general business environment, and vice versa. By using a HP filter we imply that decision-
makers gradually adjust their perception of what is the normal GDP growth rate, i.e. when the
business environment is neither improving nor deteriorating. For the smoothness parameter of
the HP filter, l, we chose the value 16. Other values of l were also tried, but these produced
trends that sometimes exhibited kinks.
An alternative to the above business cycle indicators is to use dummy variables to
represent recessions. In one specification we employ the dummy variable RECESS, which is
equal to one in the recession years 1978, 1982-3 and 1988-92. In another specification we
differentiate between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ recessions. An argument for distinguishing between a
strong and a weak recession in an exit function is that a large shock might be necessary to
induce a counter-cyclical pattern in plant turnover via exiting firms. It is well established in the
literature that incumbent firms take most of the adjustment associated with business cycle
changes, since sunk costs of entry and exit of firms are expected to be larger in most cases to
the adjustment costs of incumbent firms, cf. Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) and Caballero and
Hammour (1994, 1996). The dummy WEAKRE is employed for the minor recession years
(1978 and 1982-3), and the dummy STRONGRE for the years with the deeper recession
(1988-92). In order to test for whether old plants or plants with old capital have higher exit
rates in slumps, or in large downturns, interaction terms between the business cycle indices and
CAPAGE and PLANTAGE are formed.
In order to test the robustness of our basic model including PLANTAGE, CAPAGE
and BUSCYCLE, we condition our exit model on a number of other variables which have been
found to be important in explaining exit behaviour and which may be correlated with the age of
capital and the age of the establishment. The effect of plant size on survival is supposed to be
8captured by the logarithm of plant employment (LNEMPL). A positive correlation between the
age of the establishment and the size of the establishment is expected and the size of the
establishment should be included to isolate the age effect. Other variables included in X is a
Profits/Employees, where Profit = Sales - Wages - Materials (in mill NOK), PROFEMPL.
Profitability may also easily be correlated with the age of plants and thus should be conditioned
upon to obtain the pure age of establishment effect. Industry fixed effects are also controlled
for (4 digit ISIC level). As Lambson (1991) shows in his theoretical model of industry
evolution, the importance of the vintage effect in an industry depends on characteristics of the
industry such as the degree of sunk costs and the relative stability of factor and output prices.
We test the hypothesis of expected lower vintage effect on exits with low sunk costs by
estimating a separate model for high and low sunk costs industries. The potential impact of
plant heterogeneity on estimates is accounted for by including random plant-specific effects in
some of the estimated exit models. Other panel data models are rejected due to computational
intractability and inconsistency in estimates (Maddala, 1987).
We choose a probit model as the parametric specification of our exit model.6 The model
is given by
EXIT uit it it
* = +b x , i = 1,2, ..., N, t = 1,2,..., T,
with
EXITit =1 if EXITit
* > 0
EXITit = 0 otherwise,
where uit ~ IN(0, s u2 ). In the probit model the probability that plant i will shut down in year t is
(Maddala, 1983):
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6 The Cox proportional hazards model, which has been applied in several studies recently (Audretsch and
Mahmood, 1994, 1995; Mata et al., 1995) was considered as an alternative, but was rejected because it does
not allow the explicit inclusion of plant age as a determinant of plant survival. In the Cox specification the
effect of plant age is captured by the underlying baseline hazard rate, which is not estimated directly (Cox,
1972). The baseline hazard rate can be derived from the estimated Cox model, but it tends to exhibit very
erratic patterns.
9In words, the probability of exit is equal to the area under the standard normal distribution
from -¥  to b‘x. As the value of b‘x increases the likelihood of exit also increases.
The random effects probit model is given by:7
EXIT uit it i it
* = + +b a x , i = 1,2, ..., N, t = 1,2,..., T,
where ai ~ IN(0, s a2 ) is the plant-specific effect, and ai and uit are mutually independent and
independent of xit. This leads to a more complicated expression for the density of EXIT, see
Maddala (1987). Define s s sa2 2 2= + u  and r s s= u2 2/ . Furthermore, define v uit it u= / s ,
qi i= a s a/  and b b s* /= . Then
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the above condition can be restated as
EXITit =1 Þ  v ait it> ,
EXITit =0 Þ  v ait it£ .
The joint density of EXITit  is given by
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where F ait( )  is the common degree of freedom of the standard normal.
                                               
7 When the dependent variable is qualitative (e.g. a binary variable) and there are only a few time series
observations per individual a fixed effects approach may not give consistent estimates of the slope coefficients,
see Andersen (1973) or Chamberlain (1980). For the probit model, in particular, it is not possible to cancel out
the fixed effects (i.e. a dummy variable approach is required), and the estimates of the slope coefficients are
inconsistent. With a random effects approach the probit model is the computationally tractable alternative for
binary dependent variables (Maddala, 1987). The estimates of the probit model with random effects are
consistent. However, as in the standard model with a continuous dependent variable it is assumed that the
random effect is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. The pooled probit estimator provides consistent
but inefficient estimates in the presence of random effects.
10
3. Data, variables and preliminary results
3.1 Definitions, data and measurement issues
We have access to a panel of establishments or plants for the Norwegian manufacturing from
Statistics Norway, with annual observations, which stretches from 1976 to 1992. The
Norwegian manufacturing database is employed in the estimation of the plant exit model (See
Halvorsen et al. (1991) for a description of the data set). The plants are observed during the
1977-92 period. All manufacturing establishments with five or more employees in each year are
included in our data set, except those where the owner is working alone, and plants under
construction. Plants with less than five employees are dropped because they did not report
capital and cost figures in the manufacturing survey.
In the database an establishment is defined as a functional unit which at a single physical
location is engaged mainly in activities within a specific activity group. Production activities
with different street addresses in the same municipality are regarded as distinct establishments.
Activities undertaken by two different owners in the same plant are registered as two
establishments. Furthermore, activities in different industry groups (3-digit), are classified as
separate establishments even if the activity is located at the same site. Information on the
number of employees is annual averages, which include all persons - also owners working in
the establishment. The stock of machine and building capital is measured by the fire insurance
value.
The data set explicitly identifies new establishments, continuing establishments and
establishments that are closed down for the years 1977-86 in the so-called «entry-exit» file.
Thus, if there for instance are no data for an establishment in 1977, but data for 1978, the data
set indicates if the establishment actually started operation this year, or if there were other
reasons for missing data in 1977. Similarly, if data are present for an establishment in 1984, but
no data are available for 1985, the data set tells us if the establishment actually shut down this
year, or if there are other reasons for missing data. Explicit entry-exit information is not
available for the 1987-92 period. For these years we have treated a plant as newly established
in one year if it was observed in that year but none of the preceding years. Furthermore, if a
plant was observed in one year but none of the subsequent years, we treat it as an exit. Use of
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these procedures on the 1977-86 data where we have exact information on exits, suggests that
the absence of entry-exit information in later years does not create any biases for our analysis.
A potential problem for analysis of exits at the establishment level, may be mergers or
buy-outs at the enterprise (or firm) level. However, in the Norwegian manufacturing database
mergers or change of ownership are not a problem since the plant’s identification code is
unaffected by such events. Appendix A provides descriptive statistics of all variables used both
before and after the reduction of the number of observations because of missing data on some
variables.
3.2. Preliminary results: Restructuring and the business cycle in Norway 1976-1992
In order to give an overview of the Norwegian economy in the data period and the degree of
restructuring, we first provide some background descriptive statistics of the economic
development focusing on the business cycle and the turnover process. The role of plant exit
relative to restructuring by incumbent plants in a minor and a major recession is focused on.
In Figure 1a we present plots of the different business cycle indicators.8 They basically
follow the same pattern, and we concentrate the discussion of the time pattern of the net
employment change. The data period exhibit a recession in 1982/83 and a boom in 1985/86, a
minor recession 1978, and in addition a major recession in the late eighties from 1988. The
1982/83 recession was common to all European countries, as was the boom in the mid-
eighties. Two main reasons are important in explaining the particular Norwegian recession in
the late eighties. The drop in the oil price in 1987 affected the Norwegian economy as a major
oil-producing country, and in addition there was a big crisis in the Norwegian banking sector
following a deregulation of the sector in the mid eighties. There exists a clear distinction
between the recession in 1982/83 and the one starting in 1988. First, the negative shock was
more severe in 1988 and 1989 as is seen from Figure 1a with a decline in net employment
change in manufacturing from –0.4 percent in 1987 to -6.0 percent and -7.5 percent in 1989, as
compared to a decline from -2.9 to -6.5 percent from 1982 to 1983. Second, the recession in
the late eighties was more persistent in that the decline in net employment change is below
                                               
8 The measures of job creation and destruction reported in figure 1 are defined in appendix B.
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average following the years 1988-89.9 Hence our data set allows us to test plant exit both
during a relatively mild and strong recession.
In Figure 1b we also present the components of job turnover over time. See the
Appendix for definitions of job creation and job destruction. It is clear from Figure 1b that job
creation and destruction from plant turnover (exit/entry) is quite stable. Further, job creation
from incumbents (INCR) is fairly stable and independent of the business cycle as represented
by (NET); the standard deviation is 0.008. However, the driving force in explaining the
counter-cyclicality of the gross job turnover in Figure 1b, is the job destruction rate by
incumbents (DECR). This is confirmed by the standard deviation for DECR is 0.016 indicating
a somewhat more volatile destruction rate than job creation rate. The fact that the two (gross)
components of the activity in job reallocation in the economy have this asymmetry reflects the
negative relationship between total turnover (SUM) and the net activity (NET) in Figure 1b.
Focusing now on the role of exits relative to incumbents in restructuring in a mild and
strong recession, estimated Pearson correlation coefficients and Spearman rank coefficients are
presented in Table 1. Coefficients for the whole data period, for the minor recession in 1982/83
using data for 1977-86, and for the major recession using data from 1987-92. P-statistics are
given in the parentheses. Considering the counter-cyclicality of gross turnover for the whole
data period first, i.e., the correlation between SUM and NET, both the Pearson's and
Spearman's rank coefficients indicate a significant negative relationship with correlations of -
0.665 and -0.566, respectively. For comparison the Pearson correlation is -0.54 for the US
(1972 to 1986, i.e., including the first oil shock), and -0.25 for Canada (1972 to 1986). Now,
looking at the correlation coefficients between SUM and NET for the minor  (second line) and
major (third line) recessions, the gross turnover is far from being significant for the minor
downturn but strongly significant in the major one.10 Employment reduction is counter-cyclical
                                               
9  Also the unemployment rate for the whole economy was rising during most of the period; increasing from
below 2 percent in 1981 to above 3 percent in 1983, dropping to above 2 percent in the boom 1985/86, then
rising again in the recession in the late eighties to above 5 percent and to about 6 percent in 1992/93.
10  Boeri (1996) using similar data for Norway for the period 1976-86, also fails to find a significant counter-
cyclical pattern for gross job turnover in Norway. Boeri only finds a significant counter-cyclical relationship
for the US and not for European countries and for Canada. He points to possible explanations as differences
in the size compositions of plants of the samples in the US and Europe, and that the service sector is included
in most of the European studies. Our result indicates an alternative explanation in that one should
distinguish between the effect of a minor and a major slump. Considering the data periods used in Boeri
(1996), we notice that only the data set for US includes a major recession from the first oil shock in the early
seventies, while all the other economies analysed had only mild recession and booms.
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for incumbent firms both in the minor and major recessions, but in the minor recession it is not
strong enough to make the total turnover counter-cyclical. What is more interesting in our
context though, is that the exit rate is strongly counter-cyclical in the major downturn but not
important in the minor recession. Hence, there appears to be a structural difference in terms of
adaptation to a mild and severe recession. The minor downturn appears only to be an
adaptation to the negative shock and no counter-cyclical pattern of job turnover is detected. In
contrast to a major recession where both the adjustments of continuing plants and of exiting
plants are important.
4. Empirical Results
4.1 Testing for a vintage effect
Table 2 presents the estimated parameters for 4 different versions of the probit specification of
the exit model. The sign of estimated parameters provides information on whether the
probability of exit increases or decreases in the associated variable. A positive sign implies that
the probability of exit increases in the associated variable, while a negative sign implies
decreasing exit probability.
Columns 1 and 2 present the estimated coefficients and t-values of the model only
including second-order polynomials of the age of the plant and age of the capital. The
estimation results strongly support the assertion that one should differentiate between the age
of the plant and the vintage of its capital equipment. These two effects work in opposite
directions with respect to exit probability. The likelihood of plant shutdown is significantly
decreasing and convex in plant and the probability of shutdown increases significantly as the
age of the machine capital increases.
Before we evaluate the implications of the estimated parameters for the strength of the
vintage capital and learning effects on the exit probability over an establishment’s life-cycle, the
stability of the estimated model will be assessed. In columns 3 and 4 we test whether the exit
pattern is stable when observable variables such as the size of the plant and profitability (profits
per worker) are introduced. For instance the size of the plant may pick up the effect of the
evolution/selection effect since plants are usually small when they are established. The measure
used for profitability may be highly correlated with productivity, expected to be the driving
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force both in theories of selection and for the vintage capital model. The results show that the
probability of exit is decreasing and convex in plant size (LNEMPL) as expected. We also see
that increasing profitability (PROFEMPL) is associated with lower exit probability in all
models. However, the estimated first-order coefficients for plant age and capital age is only
slightly reduced and still significant.11
Next, we test how stable the results are when in addition to establishment size and
profitability, plant specific random effects (columns 5 and 6), and industry-specific (4-digit
ISIC level) fixed effects (columns 7 and 8) are introduced. For both these specifications the
effect of plant age and capital vintage on shutdown probability remain roughly the same. The
industry fixed effect model can be interpreted as providing the within industry exit pattern.
Hence, the observed exit probability increasing in the age of capital and decreasing in the age
of the establishment is due to the dynamics within industries and not an artefact of differences
over industries, for instance, when some industries only have a vintage effect and some only a
selection effect.
We turn now to evaluating the pattern of exit probability the estimated model predicts
for a firm over the life-cycle for different assumption regarding the capital reinvestments.12
Three cases are tested and plotted in Figure 2. We use the results from the simplest model since
the results from the extended models are not very different. First, the extreme case of no
reinvestments or the pure vintage capital model is assumed, where the age of the capital
increases one-to-one with the age of the plant. At the other extreme we allow the reinvestment
pattern to be such that the machine capital are continuously replaced. One case in between is
also presented where some degree of reinvestment is allowed for. Concentrating first on the
pure vintage model, we see from the pattern pictured in Figure 2 that the exit probability
decreases the first years after entry, and reaches its lowest level when the plant is 13-15 years.
Thereafter the exit probability increases. Hence, according to our results it seems as learning
effects dominate in the first years of the plant’s life, but that these are exhausted when the plant
has passed the age of ten. Thereafter, capital vintage effects dominate, leading to an increase in
                                               
11  Whether the plant is owned by a multi-plant operation or a single-plant firm was also tested but not found to
have any significant effect on firm survival.
12 We graph the predicted exit probabilities since the probit parameter estimates cannot be interpreted in the
same manner as for the standard regression model with continuous variables. The magnitude of the increase in
exit probability with a marginal increase in one of the x’s depends on the prior value of F(b‘x), due to its S-
shape. If F(b‘x) already is close to 1, a further increase in b‘x will only lead to a very small increase in the exit
probability.
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the probability of exit. Our results suggest that theories of industry dynamics stressing learning
effects are most relevant in the first decade of the establishment’s existence, even when it
allows the average age of its capital equipment to increase. Thereafter, the vintage capital
effect explains plant attrition. The other extreme case, where there is a continuous renewal of
the machine capital, shows as expected a more L-shaped exit probability curve and no vintage
effect. However, for the intermediate case with some reinvestments, the exit curve over the life
cycle of a curve shows a more U-shaped pattern.
An alternative approach to validate the model and assess the implications of the
estimated parameters is to evaluate the exit probability in the age of the establishment for
different observed values of the age of capital, and vice versa with the exit pattern in the age of
the establishment. In Figure 3a we present a three-dimensional plot of the exit probabilities
over age of capital and age of plant, while Figure 3b depicts the density of plants in a three-
dimensional plot. According to Figure 3a the likelihood of exit decreases rapidly in the first few
years, but stabilises at rather low levels when the plant is around ten years old. Together with
the findings from figure 2 this confirms that the effects of learning and selection apparently are
exhausted when the plant has been in existence for a decade. However, we also notice that the
vintage effect is strong for all levels of the age of the plants. However, old plants with new
capital equipment have the smallest exit probabilities. At the other extreme, younger plants
with old capital equipment have the highest probability of failure. We also see that the exit
probability increases faster in machine capital for younger plants than for older plants. Now
turning to the density of exiting plants in Figure 3b, we notice that most of the exit activity is
taking place for plants within 20 years of age and age of capital lower than 25 years.
In sum, our results show a strong U-shaped exit probability pattern where both the
learning/selection effect and the capital vintage effect are present over the life cycle of an
establishment. However, how important the vintage capital effect is may depend on market
characteristics such as the degree of sunk costs and price volatility as analysed in Lambson
(1991). In the next section the exit rates are analysed in industries with high and low levels of
sales of capital equipment to capital stock ratios, which are used as proxies for sunk costs.
4.2 The vintage effect and the degree of sunk costs.
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In Table 3 the two simplest specifications of the exit models are presented for industries with
high and low ratios of sales of capital equipment to capital stock. The sales figures include only
capital equipment previously used as input in the plant’s production. A high sales ratio
indicates a low degree of sunk costs since and active second-hand market is existing, while a
low sales ratio indicates a high degree of sunk costs (Mørch von der Fehr, 1991). Descriptive
statistics for the two sub-samples associated with low and high sales of capital equipment to
capital stock are presented in Appendix C.
In Lambson’s (1991) model the motivation for predicting a weak vintage effect in
industries characterised by low sunk costs is that new firms will choose both standard and
advanced technologies and thus some variability in exit rates is expected. Industries with high
sunk costs, on the other hand, are expected to choose the same technology when they enter.
From the results in Table 3 we note that the capital age effect is significantly positive also in the
case of high capital sales ratio industries, and even higher than for low capital sales ratio
industries. Now, to check which exit pattern the estimated coefficients provides we plot the
exit probability in the age of the establishment assuming the pure vintage model with no
reinvestment in Figure 4a and 4b. This assumption is also explicitly stated in Lambson (1991).
From the Figure 4 we observe a distinct difference in the exit pattern for the case of high and
low sunk costs: While a strong vintage effect is present in addition to the learning effects where
low sunk costs characterises the market, the vintage effect is much weaker with high sunk costs
(low sales ratio). This result contradicts the predictions from Lambson (1991), but it again
emphasises different market characteristics in explaining producer heterogeneity.
4.3 Exit probability over the business cycle
Next, we examine the estimated relationships between exit probabilities and business cycle
indicators. Results are provided in Table 4. The coefficients of two continuous business cycle
indicators (columns 1 to 4), NETRATE and GDPGROW, predict that the probability of
shutdown decreases as the growth rate of the Norwegian economy increases. However, the
coefficient GDPHP (columns 5 and 6) shows a negative sign, but is not significant, suggesting
that decision makers may be less concerned with deviations from trend growth.
Using the dummy variable approach to pick up the two recession periods provided in
columns 7 and 8, support the results using continuous indicators. Note that the recession
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dummy variable is normalised to take the value -1 in a recession. Most interestingly is the
results when we differentiate between a small and deep recession (columns 9 and 10); the exit
probability increases in the period with the most pronounced recession, 1988-92. However, in
the years with a weak recession, the likelihood of exit is not significantly different from the
years of expansion in the Norwegian economy. This confirms the descriptive statistics in Table
1 and Figure 1.
Next, we introduce interaction terms between the recession dummies and plant age and
capital age to see if older plants or plants with old machine capital equipment are more likely to
shut down in recessions. According to the empirical results presented in columns 1 and 2 of
Table 5 plants with old machine capital have a significantly higher probability of exit in
recessions (cf. RECAPAGE). Plant age does not seem to have any significant effect on the
likelihood of exit in recessions (cf. RECPAGE). Distinguishing between a weak and strong
recession presented in columns 3 and 4, we find that establishments with old capital have the
highest probability of exit both during a weak and strong recession (cf. WRCAPAGE and
SRCAPAGE). Somewhat surprisingly plant age only have a significant effect on plant shutdown
probability in the weak recession (cf. WRPAGE and SRPAGE), with young plants having the
highest probability of exit. Overall our results support the assertion that recessions are periods
of cleansing, where plants with old capital equipment are shut down.
5. Concluding remarks.
The aim of the present study has been to examine an alternative vintage capital model to the
learning/selection model to explain exit rates. In spite of the large and growing literature on
producer heterogeneity and firm exit behavior, little attention has been paid to the capital
vintage theory of firm exits as an alternative hypothesis. Interpreted at the firm level this theory
predicts that plants with old vintages of capital have higher exit rates than plants with more
recent vintages of capital. Our hypothesis is that both effects occur, predicting a U-shaped
pattern in exit rates. The failure rate is first expected to decrease in plant age due to selection
and/or learning effects, and then to increase due to the capital vintage effect. The main results
are as follows. Using a panel of Norwegian manufacturing plants and using an index of capital
age in addition to the age of the plant, we are able to disentangle the effects of learning and
capital vintage on exit rates. The empirical results suggest a U-shaped exit function in the age
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of the plant implying that both a learning effect and a vintage capital effect are present. The
vintage capital effect is also present under different assumptions concerning the rate of
investments in machine capital, when other observable variables than the age of machinery and
establishment age are introduced, as well as when unobserved establishment characteristics are
included by a random effect model.
In order to test how the strength of the vintage effect might depend on market
conditions, we test a prediction from Lambson’s (1991) model, where the model predicts a
weak vintage effect in industries characterised by low sunk costs in that entering firms will
choose both standard and advanced technologies and thus a variability in exit rates is expected,
while in industries with high sunk costs producers are expected to choose the same technology.
Testing the prediction from Lambson (1991), we find a distinct difference in the exit pattern for
the case of high and low sunk costs, but where the results contradict the predictions from
Lambson (1991).
At last, the paper contributes to the controversial point of whether restructuring is
clustered in downturns via a “shake-out” effect on plants or a “cleansing” effect. The exit rates
are found to be counter-cyclical, especially in that exits increase in a severe downturn. Using
interaction terms between the business cycle indicators and the age of capital, we find that
plants with old vintages of capital have higher exits rates during a downturn. Hence, our results
support the assertion that macro economic downturns are periods of cleansing, where old
capital equipment is scrapped.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Summary Statistics of Original and Estimating Sample
The most significant reduction in observations, from 52411 to 13495 is experienced when
plants with less than five employees in one or more years are dropped. The EXIT rate declines
markedly, and the average size of the plants (LNEMPL) is doubled. When plants with missing
data on capital and investments are dropped the sample is reduced to 12499 observations, and
the changes in the mean values are rather small.
Table A. Summary Statistics of the Sample
Variable Plants with plant age observed Plants with >=5 employees all years Estimating sample
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
EXIT 0.116 0.320 0.068 0.252 0.0747 0.263
CAPAGE N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 5.295 3.470
PLANTAGE 6.453 5.631 7.914 6.268 7.376 6.098
LNEMPL 1.590 1.193 3.034 0.985 2.997 0.948
PROFEMPL N.A. N.A. 0.044 0.170 0.042 0.174
No. of obs. 52411 13495 11174
Appendix B. Definitions of job creation and job destruction
The aggregate job turnover rates for an industry or a sector, are the sum over the employment
change rates of new, expanding, declining and dying establishments in industry i in year t,:
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respectively, where Ei,t is the set of establishments in industry i in year t, and Li,t is the total
employment in industry i, defined by:
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The gross job creation and gross job destruction rates of industry i in year t are given by:
POS INCR ENTRY i t i t i t , , , = +  and: NEG DECR EXITi t i t i t , , , = + 
respectively. The net employment change (or net job reallocation) rate is given by:
NET POS NEG i t i t i t , , , = - ,
while the gross job reallocation (or turnover) rate is defined by:
SUM POS NEG i t i t i t , , , = + .
Appendix C. Samples by Degree of Sunk Costs
Table B. Summary Statistics for sub samples associated with low and high industry mean ratio
of sales of capital equipment to capital stock.
Variable Low Sales Ratio
Sample
High Sales Ratio
Sample
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
EXIT 0.071 0.256 0.079 0.269
CAPAGE 5.448 3.487 5.139 3.445
PLANTAGE 7.692 6.173 7.055 6.004
LNEMPL 3.072 0.954 2.921 0.936
PROFEMPL 0.047 0.212 0.037 0.125
NETRATE -0.023 0.027 -0.024 0.027
GDPGROW 1.451 2.275 1.359 2.291
GDPHP -0.313 1.415 -0.331 1.417
SALECAP* 0.004 0.001 0.010 0.005
No of obs. 5638 5536
*SALECAP = industry mean ratio of sales of capital equipment to capital stock.
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TABLES
Table 1. Time series properties of gross job flows in Norwegian manufacturing, 1977-92.
Pearson corr. Spearman rank
Year r(NET,SUM) r(NET,DECR) r(NET,EXIT) (NET,SUM) (NET,DECR) (NET,EXIT)
1977-92 -0,665 -0,969 -0,701 -0,566 -0,935 -0,580
(0,005) (0,000) (0,003) (0,022) (0,000) (0,018)
1977-86 -0,258 -0,942 -0,289 0,086 -0.085 0.003
(0.471) (0,000) (0,418) (0,814) (0,0018) (0,993)
1987-92 -0,900 -0,986 -0,928 -0,841 -0,943 -0,928
(0,015) (0,003) (0,008) (0,036) (0,005) (0,008)
Note: P-values in the parentheses.
Table 2. Estimated Parameters of Probit Models of Plant Exit.
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Col. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CAPAGE 0.048 2.370 0.043 1.935 0.040 1.855 0.041 1.844
CAPAGE2 -0.0007 -0.987 -0.001 -1.063 -0.001 -0.953 -0.001 -1.029
PLANTAGE -0.203 -12.961 -0.159 -9.447 -0.169 -10.253 -0.152 -8.947
PLANTAGE2 0.006 9.804 0.005 6.902 0.005 7.354 0.004 6.301
LNEMPL -0.873 -7.914 -0.860 -8.115 -0.831 -7.393
LNEMPL2 0.089 5.255 0.089 5.481 0.081 4.660
PROFEMPL -1.105 -6.936 -1.121 -6.275 -1.131 -6.959
Constant -0.879 -18.284 0.678 4.053 0.672 4.148 0.495 2.164
Pseudo-R2 0.087 0.130 0.137
Log-likel. -2710.99 -2583.84 -2562.70
Table 3. Probit Model Estimates for Plant Exit by Ratio Sales of Capital to Capital Stock.
Variable Low Sales Share Sample High Sales Share Sample
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
CAPAGE 0.034 1.146 0.030 0.937 0.061 2.131 0.054 1.721
CAPAGE2 0.000 -0.325 0.000 -0.375 -0.001 -1.008 -0.001 -1.043
PLANTAGE -0.188 -8.293 -0.143 -5.912 -0.218 -9.850 -0.174 -7.320
PLANTAGE2 0.005 5.738 0.004 3.775 0.007 7.951 0.006 5.876
LNEMPL -0.794 -4.347 -0.905 -6.607
LNEMPL2 0.071 2.436 0.100 4.848
PROFEMPL -0.919 -4.697 -1.480 -5.306
Constant -0.876 -12.569 0.626 2.314 -0.882 -13.127 0.685 3.211
Pseudo-R2 0.0923 0.1414 0.0820 0.1207
Log-l. -1308.25 -1237.38 -1401.28 -1342.18
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Table 4. Probit Model Estimates for Plant Exit over the Business cycle.
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Col. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CAPAGE 0.044 7.817 0.040 1.852 0.042 1.904 0.043 1.949 0.037 1.684
CAPAGE2 -0.001 -5.054 -0.001 -0.831 -0.001 -0.971 -0.001 -1.013 -0.001 -0.815
PLANTAGE -0.161 -14.341 -0.159 -9.394 -0.159 -9.452 -0.160 -9.475 -0.154 -9.090
PLANTAGE2 0.005 11.534 0.005 6.753 0.005 6.879 0.005 6.905 0.004 6.496
LNEMPL -0.870 -7.883 -0.868 -7.858 -0.872 -7.903 -0.870 -7.883 -0.870 -7.875
LNEMPL2 0.089 5.305 0.089 5.231 0.089 5.249 0.089 5.242 0.090 5.254
PROFEMPL -1.099 -6.806 -1.090 -6.834 -1.103 -6.920 -1.104 -6.924 -1.101 -6.897
NETRATE -1.522 -2.279
GDPGROW -0.030 -3.551
GDPHP -0.015 -1.115
RECESS -0.078 -2.007
WEAKRE 0.070 1.108
STRONGRE -0.121 -2.952
Constant 0.637 2.378 0.714 4.252 0.672 4.019 0.632 3.743 0.636 3.762
Pseudo-R2 0.1305 0.1318 0.1299 0.1304 0.1320
Log-likel. -2581.53 -2577.51 -2583.21 -2581.82 -2577.13
Table 5. Probit Model Estimates for Plant Exit over the Business Cycle with Interaction
Terms.
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
CAPAGE 0.013 0.524 0.003 0.136
CAPAGE2 0.000 -0.492 0.000 -0.119
PLANTAGE -0.152 -8.715 -0.129 -7.247
PLANTAGE2 0.005 6.533 0.004 4.611
LNEMPL -0.864 -7.812 -0.871 -7.826
LNEMPL2 0.089 5.214 0.090 5.241
PROFEMPL -1.099 -6.896 -1.095 -6.847
RECESS 0.040 0.601
RECAPAGE -0.050 -2.474
RECPAGE 0.020 1.533
WEAKRE 0.022 0.165
STRONGRE 0.032 0.449
WRCAPAGE -0.140 -2.076
WRPAGE 0.157 2.988
SRCAPAGE -0.042 -2.048
SRPAGE 0.006 0.450
Constant 0.693 4.033 0.685 3.969
Pseudo-R2 0.1314 0.1363
Log-likel. -2578.7 -2564.3
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Figure 1. The Time Pattern of the Net Job Reallocation Rate and its components plus other
Business Cycle Indicators.
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28
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
PLANTAGE and CAPAGE
P
ro
b(
E
X
IT
)
High Sales Ratio
Low  Sales Ratio
Figure 4. Predicted Exit Probabilities for High and Low Sales Capital-Capital Stock Ratios.
